Techlog training manuals#

The TAF was giving this conditions later (something about 2-3 hours later) and the reports we had at the beginning of the diversion was good (something like 5000 mt and BKN 020). What I experienced a couple of years ago was something similar (diversion was executed due to unexpected fog (nothing on the TAF at all) at destination with ILS U/S that day) to my example except that, after having chosen the best weather alternate, second or third commercial option, I don't remember exactly, during the 20 min trip to that the visibility and RVR dropped quickly there too. Thank you for your opinions and insights guys The Drone incident at LGW and the Multiple pan / Maydays a couple of years ago when there was smoke in the atmosphere quickly start to show how easily things can start to break down when things go wrong on a large scale. This does highlight the disconnect in safety management between airline minimum fuel policies and the way ATC and Airfield ops think. The controller quickly picked up on the point we were making and strangely, the three airports suddenly started taking diversions.

We all had plenty fuel but ended up having a bizarre RT conversation about exactly what did they want us to do then and when would it be convenient for these airports for us to say the 'M' word. Simultaneously, the controller put out a broadcast announcing that neither EDI, GLA or INV were accepting diversions. I had a classic example of this once when three jets arrived in the hold at ABZ when the weather had fallen below limits and it was not forecast. At the other end of the line, a Commander through company policy and unexpected changing circumstances can end up only a few minutes away for having to adapt from following the rules to doing what is necessary to save life. Making their airfield available for diversions depends on things like stands and handling availability or simply whether there is enough profit to be made for the extra hassle. Part of the problem in this sort of scenario is that airport ops managers (sitting in cosy offices) risk asses everything to death and are driven by the accountants.

Techlog training manuals#

I think most ops manuals require one lower level of minima (cat 1 for expected cat 2/3) for 'committing' so I would probably use that in my justification. In the scenario you mention, you have effectively committed and most ops manuals tend to describe the scenario of committing and lay down criteria, even if they don't actually call it that. These documents do refer to the fact that it is far easier these days for pilots to gather information from other sources other than ATC so it should be possible to involve Ops with decision making but having looked at these docs, I can see how you got several different answers and why one ops controller might offer completely different advice than another.

Personally, I would go with the planning minima because as mentioned, many the other things that can go wrong which would preclude a certain approach are not likely to become apparent until on approach (flaps stuck?). There doesn't seem to be any reference to requiring a higher minima approach as per the planning rules so diverting to cat 2/3 is probably OK but perhaps not wise. Why not consider Waddington for BHX or EMA say, if it is open and if there are problems and several Min fuel calls on freq? An unintended diversion to a military airfield is also classed as less than safe but it is in the controllers toolbox once it looks like Mayday fuels calls are a possibility. The word safe seems to imply that there could be a less safe option and this would by default become applicable once the MAYDAY fuel call has been made or if committed to a particular airfield and stuck with having to land below minima. My basic understanding is that once airborne, the Commander's responsibility is to use all available information to manage fuel/energy to make a safe landing at a suitable aerodrome with Final Reserve Fuel remaining. Airline policies tend to be based on these documents but I don't think the training world has caught up with the 100+ pages of tech jargon. There is a lot of useful information in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Doc 9976 and there are also draft EASA docs on the net which attempt to mirror and expand on what ICAO are saying.